Toward Community Ownership of Cable Television by unknown
Toward Community Ownership
of Cable Television
Broadcast television has emerged in the past two decades as the most
powerful instrument of communication ever devised. It can transmit
ideas and opinions to masses of individuals with unrivaled facility.
The communicative power represented by broadcast television, how-
ever, is concentrated in a few hands; it has come to reflect a narrow
range of ideas and a rampant commercialism that negate much of its
potential as an educational or community-centered communication
tool.1
Cable television (CATV)2 is promoted as an alternative to broad-
cast television designed to alleviate some of the problems caused by
concentration of ownership. Cable possesses a new communication
technology capable of increasing greatly the variety and content of
electronic communications, for it permits the carriage of up to forty
1. See, e.g., Bryant, Historical and Social Aspects of Concentration of Program Con-
trol in Television, 34 LAW & CONTEMIP. PROD. 610 (1969); Jones, The Cultural and So-
cial Impact of Advertising on American Society, 8 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 65 (1970); Pember,
The Broadcaster and the Public Interest: A Proposal to Replace an Unfaithful Servant,
4 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 83 (1971).
2. CATV (community antenna television system), also known as cable television, is a
method of transmitting television signals by means of wire or coaxial cable. A CATV
system is usually composed of a master antenna, frequently located in an elevated place
where it can best pick up the electromagnetic waves of conventional broadcast tele-
vision, and cable linkage which first extends as major trunk lines from the origination
point or head-end and later branches off in smaller feeder lines. Drop lines are then
connected from the feeder lines directly to subscribers' homes. Broadcast television re-
ception is presently cable's most attractive feature, bringing viewers channels they
normally could not receive from their TV or house antenna. See generally SLOAN
COMM'N ON CABLE COMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION or ABUNDANCE 11
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN COMM'N].
Cable television has maintained a steady period of growth covering two decades. In
1952 there were 70 CATV systems serving 14,000 customers. By 1962 this had increased
to 800 systems serving 850,000 subscribers. CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES: COIMUNITY
CONTROL, PUBLIC ACCESS, AND MINORITY OWNERSHIP 12 (C. Tate ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIESJ. From 1962 to 1972 the total number of systems
more than tripled to 2,883. TELEVISION DIGEST, CATV ADDENDA TO TELEVISION FACTBOOK
No. 42, at I (Dec. 25, 1972) (Weekly CATV addenda). It is generally agreed, however,
that restrictions on the importation of distant broadcast signals by CATV into the big
city areas has stunted the industry's growth. See Barnett, State, Federal and Local
Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 685, 688-90 (1972); Botein, Access
to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 419-21 (1972). In Teleprompter Corp. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 94 S. Ct. 1129 (1974), however, the Supreme Court ruled that
the importation of distant signals by a CATV operator does not constitute a per-
formance under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), and therefore no fees can
be imposed by the copyright proprietor. Id. at 1138. See generally Note, Cable Tele-
vision and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 554 (1974).
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channels at once.3 Cable can thus serve as a community information
reservoir, transmitting a broad spectrum of cultural programming,
educational material 4 and local governmental activities to the com-
munities it serves. Because its programming standards need not be
uniformly high, CATV is particularly well suited to present locally
produced, nonprofessional programs, which could range from simple
talk shows to highly sophisticated documentaries. 5 This means that
CATV operators can provide true "public access," opening the doors
of their origination studios so that area residents, and not just CATV
owners and advertisers, can produce programming suited to their
needs.6 This technology thus permits the general public, including
various minority groups, to use the communicative power of television
3. SLOAN ComM'N, supra note 2, at 37. CATV's greatest advantage is its multi-
channel capacity. This is made possible by the use of coaxial cables, which permit
more efficient use of wavelength bands than broadcast television does, by avoiding the
wavelength overlap that occurs when signals are transmitted through the air. Id. at 11-22.
In 1968 the FCC forecast that "the expanding multichannel capacity of cable systems
could be utilized to provide a variety of new communications services to homes and
businesses within a community, in addition to services now commonly offered." In re
CATV, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 419-20 (1968). Among the services mentioned by the FCC
were: facsimile reproduction of newspapers and magazines; electronic mail delivery;
information retrieval; and various educational and training programs, e.g., job and
literacy training, preschool programs, and professional continuing education programs.
Id. at 420. The Supreme Court has echoed this forecast. United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972).
4. Cable television has a tremendously broad range of public service possibilities.
For some of the more useful ones, see M. PRICE & J. WICKLEIN, CABLE TELEvisION: A
GuiDE FOR CITIZEN ACrION 2-3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRICE & WVICKLEIN]; Molenda,
CATV and Access to Knowledge, 2 YALE REv. L. 9- Soc. ACTION 193, 243-50 (1972).
5. On the importance of programming diversity, see Barnett, Cable Television and
Media Concentration, Part I: Control of Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 221, 254-58 (1970). This goal was implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1968): "It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market."
See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-14
(1973); In re CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 205, 207 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
6. For an example of how this has worked in a New York City CATV system, see
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 40. FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson
sees the public access concept more in realpolitik terms. He describes the nonpublic
access system as broadcasters reserving "sole discretion on which spokesmen and which
time a certain point of view is allowed." However, public access "would allow groups
to choose their own spokesmen and present their own views in the fashion they deem
most favorable." Id. at 34.
One technological feature of CATV that would have a dramatic impact in this area
is "two-way" communication. This would allow the viewer to communicate with either
the origination studio or other viewers, in forms ranging from a simple yes-or-no feed-
back device to full audiovisual intercommunication. Community members would not only
acquire a greater familiarity with the medium by being able to "talk back" to their
television, but they would also be provided with an entire new system of intracom-
munity communication. See Molenda, supra note 4, at 245; PRICE & WICKLEIN, supra
note 4, at 26-27. See generally id. at 1-18; Johnson & Gerlach, The Coming Fight for
Cable Access, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 217 (1972); Challenge for Change/Societe
Nouvelle,_Newsletter No. 7, Winter 1971-72 (published by the Nat'l Film Board of
Canada); id., No. 4, Spring-Summer 1969.
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for personal, community, or group purposes not presently served by
broadcast television with its general programming designed for a mass
audience.7
This potential, however, can be effectively nullified by those who
own cable systems if those owners use cable television only for the
transmission of broadcast signals. In response to this threat, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) in the past decade has
promulgated several sets of rules governing CATV, culminating in
its 1972 requirement that cable operators provide one free public
access channel.8 The purpose of these rules, as the FCC put it, is to
offer to the community "a practical opportunity to participate in
community dialogue through a mass medium."9
This Note will examine the present regulatory system and those
institutions which determine or influence public access to CATV. It
will discuss the weaknesses of these regulations and institutions,
weaknesses which will tend to hinder the effective implementation
of the FCC's important goal of "community self-expression."' 10 The
Note suggests further that community ownership of CATV franchises
constitutes the most effective means of achieving that goal, and it
concludes with a discussion of the regulatory changes needed to im-
plement community ownership.
I. The FCC's Public Access Rules for CATV
The FCC showed some concern for local expression in an early
regulatory venture in the cable field. Its 1966 rules required cable
operators to carry all local broadcast signals on demand, compelled
cable operators to refrain from importing and showing broadcast pro-
7. See CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES, supra note 2, at 16-17. See also N. JOHNSON,
HOW TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET 13-16 (1967); Mendelsohn, The Neglected
Majority: Mass Communications and the Working Person, Mar. 1971, at 68-70 (report
prepared for the Sloan Comm'n).
Efforts to increase access of minority groups to broadcast television have been stymied
in large part by certain inherent characteristics of that medium. First, most television
broadcast channels are in the VHF (very high frequency) range. Few channels can
coexist in this band without substantial interference. Thus, broadcast television has op-
erated on the premise that where there is a scarcity of channels, programming must
appeal to as broad a segment of the population as possible, effectively discouraging
minority-oriented broadcasts. Likewise, because of the limited availability of broadcast
channels, their cost has placed ownership beyond the reach of all but a few. For a
detailed technical explanation of the limitations of broadcast television, see SLOAN
COMM'N, supra note 2, at 16-20.
8. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973). See pp. 1711-12 infra.
9. 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 3270 (1972).
10. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699 (1965).
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gramming in the same time period that local broadcast stations planned
to air that program, and ordered that there be no further cable im-
portation of distant signals into the top 100 television markets.,"
The FCC's first real effort to establish limited public access to
CATV was associated with its so-called carriage and duplication rules,
promulgated in 1969.12 Under them, the FCC conditions the right
of a CATV operator to carry broadcast television signals, both local
and distant, on the stipulation that the operator originate a substantial
portion of his programming. 13 This local origination requirement
creates a degree of community self-expression since the programming
to be produced and transmitted is necessarily directed to the interests
of the local community that a particular CATV outlet serves.' 4 In con-
trast, the broadcast programming that a CATV outlet would otherwise
carry is directed to a state or regional audience.
On February 12, 1972, the FCC released its most detailed and sys-
tematic CATV regulations.'3 Of particular interest were the so-called
"public access" provisions.' 6 Essentially, these provisions required that
every CATV system designate one channel for public access, one for
educational access, one for the use of local government, and one for
short-term lease by the general public.' 7 The public access channel is
to be made available to members of the public on a first-come, first-
served basis, with equipment and studio facilities to be provided by
the CATV operator.' 8 The lease channel is to be rented at a charge to
the public.' 9 The Commission again required CATV operators to
provide these designated access channels as a condition precedent to
reception of broadcast television signals.
20
11. In re CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 797-807 (1966). In United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), and United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972),
the Supreme Court approved the FCC's assertion of sole authority over CATV.
12. In re CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 205 (1969).
13. In re CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
14. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699 (1965). See also note 3 supra.
15. 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1973).
16. Id. § 76.251.
17. All four of these channels are to be operated on a common carrier basis, open
to the specified groups. Three of them-the public, educational, and local government
access channels-are to be made available without charge. Id. § 76.251(a)(10). The FCC
described these rules as interim and pointed to a need for free experimentation and
the maintenance of programming diversity as its two greatest sources of guidance in
promulgating the public access requirements. CATV Regulation-Report to Congress, 22
P & F RAfIo REG. 2d 1775 (1971).
18. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4) (1973).
19. Id. § 76.251(a)(7).
20. Id. § 76.251(a). The regulation applies only to those CATV systems in the top
100 television markets with at least 3,500 subscribers.
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II. The Effectiveness of the FCC Public Access Approach
These efforts by the FCC to promote public access to cable televi-
sion represent a positive step toward community self-expression. The
impact of the FCC's approach, however, may be diminished by the
discretion lodged in local franchising authorities, by resistance of
CATV ownership, and by a number of weaknesses in the public
access rules themselves.
A. Problems in the Public Access Rules
A crucial ingredient for public access channel development is the
availability of sufficient video equipment.
21 Yet the only mention of
equipment in the FCC's public access rules is an opaque passage re-
quiring franchisees to provide "at least the minimal equipment and
facilities necessary .... *22 Nowhere are either "minimal" or "neces-
sary" explained. A related problem exists with respect to leased chan-
nels, available for a fee to the general public. The FCC rules mention
neither what procedures are to be followed in leasing channels nor
what constitutes an appropriate leasing fee.
23
Second, the FCC has not required that programming funds be pro-
vided to help defray the costs of those interested in utilizing the public
access channels.24 The FCC apparently contemplated that, with studio
equipment and facilities provided by the franchisees, programming
costs would be negligible and would not significantly discourage use
of the public access channel.23 But the origination of programming,
even with equipment provided, is relatively costly.
26 Low-income pub-
21. See, e.g., Achtenberg, A Word to the Wise; Study that Franchise, THE 
URBAN
REv., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 29; N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), 
at 40.
22. 47 C.F.R. 76.251(a)(4) (1973).
23. Id. §§ 76.251(a)(7) & (a)(1l)(iii). Leased channels may be most important 
to mi-
nority community groups and others, who, unable to obtain the nearly one million 
dollars
that purchase of a franchise may require, would at least be able to operate a channel 
on
a leased basis.
24. The FCC is now considering a proposal by Open Channel, a nonprofit 
CATV
training group, to establish community level bodies which would coordinate funds di-
rected to production facilities. BROADCASTING, May 28, 1973, at 51. However, an im-
portant ingredient is absent-money. Id.
25. 37 Fed. Reg. 3271-72 (1972). However, the rules themselves specify that production
costs, except for live studio presentations of five minutes or less, can be charged to
users. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4) & (10)(ii) (1973).
26. See PRICE & WICKLEIN, supra note 4, at 13942. Although cable has been highly
touted for its suitability for low cost production, the expenses of adequate programming
may still be more than many are able or prepared to pay. For the cost of presenting
a very simple program format, see Dordick & Lyle, Access by Local Political Candidates
to Cable Television: A Report of an Experiment, Nov. 1971, at 8-10 (Rand Corp. Report
no. R-881-MF). Some authorities claim that the cost of programming on a public access
basis is beyond the grasp of most communities and especially those of the inner-city
ghettoes. See Feldman, Cable Television: Opportunities and Problems in Local Program
Origination, Sept. 1970, at 20-24 (Rand Corp. Report no. R-570-FF, prepared for the
Ford Foundation).
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lic access users can avoid prohibitive costs only by employing a simple
in-studio format, most likely of the commentary or discussion variety.
27
While this type of restricted programming is communicative in the
strict sense, such a narrow format emasculates the concept of com-
munity self-expression and can demean the public access user's mes-
sage, relegating it to such a low level of viewing desirability as to de-
press its viewing audience and thereby muffle its voice.
B. The Impact of Local Discretion
The FCC, recognizing that some deference to local authority is a
practical necessity, 28 has withheld total federal preemption of CATV
in its 1972 rules, designating certain areas of regulation for the domain
of the states or localities. The regulatory powers reserved to the local
regulatory authorities, whether they be states or municipalities, include
the power to decide who will be granted a particular CATV franchise,
what the specifications for the franchisee's facilities will be, what rates
the franchisee will charge subscribers, and how consumer complaints
will be processed and resolved.2 9 Local authorities exercise powers
only within the guidelines the FCC has adopted,3 0 but they retain
considerable discretion which can severely affect the efficacy of the
FCC public access rules.
The method by which local authorities select the licensee for a par-
ticular CATV franchise may have significant consequences for public
access. The FCC standards require only that each local franchising
authority, clothed with the power to allocate CATV licenses or certifi-
27. In New York City, where pre-1972 municipal regulations already required a
CATV public access channel, the experience was that while many groups or individuals
were able to program at no cost, those of moderate means who envisioned something
more ambitious than talk shows found costs to be roadblocks. SLOAN COMM'N, supra
note 2, at 231-35.
28. This deference is compelled at least partially by the administrative nightmares
associated with allocating franchises to the thousands of communities which have or
will have CATV. For an extended discussion of the legal and practical arguments for
local autonomy, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 764-70.
29. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1973).
30. At the time that the franchise is allocated there must be a public hearing at
which the "franchisee's legal, character, financial, technical, and other qualifications,
and the adequacy and feasibility of its construction arrangements" are examined. Id.
§ 76.31(a)(1). The franchisee must also stipulate that construction will begin within one
year after FCC certification and that it will proceed at a reasonable rate thereafter. The
reasonable rate is measured in terms of equipping some given percentage of the fran-
chise area each year. In re Valley Cable Vision, Inc., 26 P & F RADIO REG. 320 (1973);
47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(2) (1973). Furthermore, the franchise, when first granted, cannot ex-
tend for more than 15 years, although it is renewable for reasonable periods thereafter.
Id. § 76.31(a)(3). All rates or charges levied by the franchisee must be sanctioned by
the franchising authority subject to public hearings when an increase is contemplated.
Id. § 76.31(l)(4). Also, procedures must exist for the resolution of consumer complaints
regarding service. Id. § 76.31(a)(5). Lastly, a franchise fee may be no greater than three
to five percent of an operator's gross revenue, unless it can be shown not to interfere
with federal regulatory goals. Id. § 76.31(b).
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cates of operation, consider the legal, character, financial, and tech-
nical suitability of each applicant for a franchise and review the ap-
propriateness of the applicant's franchise development plans. 31 Finan-
cial position and technical expertise provide a fairly objective and
easily applied method for initially selecting from among applicants.
Beyond these requirements, however, the local authority is given little
FCC guidance in setting allocation standards. Thus, the local author-
ity may resort to whatever subjective qualifications it cares to employ,
and there is little in the regulations to check the influence of political
or personal favoritism. 32 In addition, franchising authorities may pre-
fer profit-oriented, nationwide conglomerate applicants over local non-
profit ones because they seem to offer better financial and technical
suitability. Such preferences, however, might have serious implica-
tions for the communication needs of a particular locality, since a local
nonprofit organization might promote community self-expression more
than a national, profit-oriented operator.3 3
In addition, the authority to approve the location of a CATV fran-
chisee's origination studio, or to require that there be additional stu-
dios in areas most accessible to the public, is delegated to local regu-
latory authorities.34 If the local regulator does not encourage the
location of studios near the largest population possible, the distance
may inhibit the use of the facilities because users may be unable or
unwilling to travel a long way for this purpose.
31. See note 31 supra. Once the applicant has received a local franchise, he must
receive a certificate of compliance from the FCC before he can begin operating. 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.11, 76.13 (1973).
32. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 691-94. As an illustration, in Connecticut present
and former state representatives, a town chairman, and a former gubernatorial candidate
have had either ownership interests or some other significant position in five of the nine
locally owned franchises. Supplementary Brief for Petitioner at 9-14, In re Govern-
mental Affairs Council, No. 11366 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1973). Several bribery and
extortion scandals have already arisen in connection with the allocation of CATV
franchises by local authorities. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 691; Wall St. J., Oct. 21,
1971, at 8, col. 2; Apr. 20, 1971, at 38, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1971, at 78, col. 6.
A lack of effective or realistic notice of the availability of franchises tends to result
in a limited pool of political or business "insider" applicants. In Connecticut, for
example, which, like most states, has adopted the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act, notice or publication consists of publication in the Connecticut Law Journal, which
is not a periodical of wide public circulation. CONN. GEN. STAr. REv. § 4-168(a)(1) (Supp.
1973). A statewide coalition of petitioners before the Connecticut Public Utilities Com-
mission has in fact cited lack of effective notice as a reason for requesting the revo-
cation of all the CATV franchises issued in the state. This petition was denied on
March 24, 1973. Brief for Petitioner at 4, In re Governmental Affairs Council, No.
11366 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1973). One authority has pointed out that the re-
quirement that there should be "a public invitation to those who might want to
compete for the franchise .. ." was mysteriously omitted from the FCC's present CATV
regulations. Barnett, supra note 2. at 735.
33. See generally PRICE & WICKLEIN, supra note 4, at 45-46; SLOAN COM/1'N, supra
note 2, at 128.
34. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(1) & (2) (1973).
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Finally, the FCC restricts the fees that a local authority may charge
a franchisee. 3; Although these restrictions are aimed at preventing
fee-gouging, they may also discourage a local authority from charging
even slightly higher franchise fees which could be spent to provide
the additional equipment and training necessary for effective use of
the public access channels.36
C. Ownership's Discretionary Powers
Under the FCC's present regulatory system, the private cable opera-
tor for all practical purposes owns the CATV systemY7 This proprietary
interest gives rise to inherent powers which can overcome the purposes
of the FCC's public access rules.
Private owners are necessarily concerned with maximizing profits,
and their primary allegiance is to their investors. Profit maximization
in the cable television industry is represented by an axiom: the more
subscribers, the more revenue. Given this orientation, it is difficult
for CATV owners to justify occasional programming alterations which
require the expenditure of funds, yet may not attract additional sub-
scribers. Because of this, as in broadcast television, there may be a
tendency to avoid attempts at innovative community-oriented program-
ming for fear of risking the loss of profit.38 The vagueness in the pub-
lic access rules covering the equipment and expertise that must be
provided by the CATV operator 9 essentially leaves this to the owner's
discretion. Thus, an owner seeking to avoid expenses can provide
inadequate or inferior equipment that limits the public access user's
ability to present his message effectively. And, when ownership is in
35. Id. § 76.31(b).
36. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, In re Governmental Affairs Council, No.
11366 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1973). Sol Schildhause, Chief of the Cable Television
Bureau of the FCC, had recognized the problem:
There is no hard and fast answer to this question [of charging higher franchise
fees in order to fund public access] at present. Clearly, however, the factors that
would bear heavily in the Commission's consideration of any such scheme would
include the amount of excess fee, the danger that through funding, local govern-
ment would control public access programming, and the possibility of other
alternatives.
37 Fed. Reg. 19397 (1972). See also 46 F.C.C.2d 175 (1974).
37. CATV is unlike broadcast television where a licensee cannot own the airwaves.
Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970j; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Broadcast television utilizes a natural and equally shared
medium for transmission, whereas CATV transmission depends totally on the hardware
bought and constructed by the CATV operator. Furthermore, a broadcast television
licensee is endowed with some remnants of "private ownership" over the airwaves. See
Note, The Broadcast Media and the First Amendment: A Redefinition, 22 Am. U.L.
REV. 180, 216 (1972). Therefore, for the purposes of the argument here, it is reasonable
to assume that a CATV franchisee has interests of a proprietary nature.
38. See N. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 20-24; M. MAYER, ABOUT TELEVISION 277-312 (1972).
39. See p. 1712 supra.
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private hands, the profits from the CATV system 40 need not be used
for any purpose that does not promote the owner's business or per-
sonal goals. Such aims are not likely to include public access. 41
Because the owner controls the actual mechanical telecasting of pub-
lic access programming, he is in a position to censor or influence what
is shown. In spite of FCC rules prohibiting cable operators from cen-
soring what goes on the public access channels, 42 some operators ap-
pear to be prescreening public access material. 43 Public access will not
engender the diversity of programming and opinion characteristic of
community self-expression if owners are allowed to impose their per-
sonal standards of acceptability on public access users.
Furthermore, the FCC has identified localism as an important in-
gredient in its regulatory policy. 44 Yet its tendency to favor, or its lack
of desire to oppose, concentration of ownership in CATV45 contributes
to a situation where national conglomerates will control most CATV
systems.40 This concentration of control stands in the way of any
40. These profits will be largely from the telecasting of broadcast TV. See M. SEIDEN,
CABLE TELEVISION U.S.A.: AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 3, 21-22 (1972); S. Rivkin,
The Alternative Futures of Cable TV, Mar. 1971, at 1-4 (paper prepared for the Sloan
Comm'n); Barnett, supra note 5, at 225.
41. See N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 40.
42. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(9) (1973).
43. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1973, at 75, col. 1; Apr. 11, 1973, at 95, col. 1. The
FCC's 1972 CATV regulations specifically prohibit the operator from exercising control
over program content with the exceptions of obscenity and lotteries. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(9)
& (11) (1973). However, the question arises whether the CATV operator should be the
one to decide what is objectionable. Additionally, many operators, spurred by fears of
libel suits caused by their uncertain liability for programming on the access channels,
may choose not to show what they feel might place them in jeopardy. See 37 Fed. Reg.
3271 (1972).
44. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699 (1965).
45. A recent agreement between two leading cable television corporations and a
number of California minority groups gave those groups a guarantee of leased cable
time, at one dollar a channel, in return for a promise not to oppose the merger of
the two companies. The FCC has not taken any action to overturn the agreement.
Agreement between ATC, Cox Cable, and various California Non-Profit Minority Or-
ganizations, 1972, at 2. The Justice Department in December 1972 brought suit to halt
the merger. The FCC's Cable Bureau opposed the minority agreement portion of the
package on the grounds that it amounted to coercion. Johnson & Dystel, A Day in the
Life: The Federal Communications Commission, 82 YALE L.J. 1575, 1599 & nn.112-14
(1973). See Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1972, at 10, col. 2.
46. The FCC in 1970 permitted the merger of Teleprompter and H & B American
Corporation, the first and third largest cable operators. The FCC based its approval on
the additional access and programming features Teleprompter was offering and, as Tele-
prompter argued, on "Teleprompter's financial capability to engage in quality program
origination which will result in greater program diversity for public viewing .... . In
re Teleprompter Transmission, 25 F.C.C.2d 469, 477 (1970). See also Johnson & Dystel,
supra note 45, at 1578 & n.l1. This was done in disregard of the caveats of such ob-
servers as President Johnson's Task Force on Communications which warned in 1968
that multiple ownership might eventually require restrictive governmental action. U.S.
PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, FINAL REPORT 49 (1968). See also
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significant diversity of programming. 47
Two case histories from broadcast television provide general illus-
trations of how the broad powers of ownership can be exercised to
thwart community-oriented programming. First, in 1970 the FCC
adopted its prime time access rule requiring that stations in the top
fifty markets limit network programming to a total of three hours
from 7 to 11 p.m., local time.48 The regulation was prompted by the
FCC's desire to reduce the three major networks' influence over pro-
gramming 49 and to introduce increased local origination. It went into
effect in September 1971, and evidence that the results were undesir-
able led the FCC to modify the regulations three years later.50 Instead
of encouraging innovative and diversified programming, the rule re-
sulted in a renaissance of Truth or Consequences and Hee-Haw re-
Note, Diversification in Communication: The FCC and Its Failing Standards, 1969 UTAH
L. REV. 494, 497.
Figures compiled in November 1972 showed that the top four cable operators-Tele-
prompter, Cox American, Warner Communications, Tele-Communications-together serve
fully one-half the total number of subscribers served by the top 25 CATV corporations
combined. TELEVISION DicEsr, SPECIAL WESTERN CABLE TELEVISION SHOW SUPPLEMENT 1-3
(prepared for CCTA Convention, Nov. 15-18, 1972). In Connecticut, for example, of 17
total franchises, Teleprompter has three. In re CATV Systems, Nos. 10268, 10321 & 10314
(Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, May 21, 1969). The FCC has proposed the idea of con-
trolling multiple ownership but has never undertaken any such policy. 35 Fed. Reg.
1104243 (1970).
Another problem distinct from multiple ownership is cross-ownership-control of CATV
outlets by other segments of the communications industry. President Johnson's Task
Force on Communications warned that:
Owners of nationally-distributed magazines, television stations, film studios, chains
of motion picture theaters, and, especially, television networks, will likely prove to
be better competitors of or suppliers of program material, or both, to cable television
systems. In view of these possibilities, both the FCC and the Department of Justice,
as well as the Congress, should scrutinize developing patterns of ownership in the
cable industry with an eye for conflicts of interest or threats of media domination.
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, supra, at 49. In 1968, the National
Cable Television Association's Chairman, Robert Beisswenger, reported that 30 percent
of the cable systems in operation were controlled by broadcasters and that, of 256 systems
started in 1966, 46 percent were owned by radio or television interests. BROADCASTING,
May 12, 1968, at 29. In 1972, the FCC began to move to limit cross-ownership. Though
its regulations do not deal with radio or newspaper cross-ownership, they do constitute
a significant prohibition on cross-ownership by network interests and by broadcast tele-
vision stations in the area of the CATV system. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1973). But the FCC
may undermine the regulation by its encouragement of applications for exceptions. See
38 Fed. Reg. 2970, 2977 (1973). The impact of common- and cross-ownership concen-
tration of CATV has been extensively explored. See Barnett, supra note 5.
47. The concentration of the media also has a detrimental effect on news reporting, es-
pecially with respect to facts relating to the concentration itself. Barnett, supra note
5, at 280.
48. In re Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 384 (1971).
49. The FCC stated that it wanted to see "an increase in the opportunity for de-
velopment of truly independent sources of prime time programming." Id. at 394. While
its concern was obviously not directed at the issue of public access per se, the effect
is to increase diversity of programming.
50. In re "prime time access rule," 29 P & F RADIO RE.. 2d 643 (1974). The new
regulations will not go into effect, however, until September 1974. Id. at 712, 997.
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runs.0 ' This misapplication apparently occurred because the FCC
gave all responsibility for introducing this independent programming
to the local station's management. Instead of maximizing diversity, it is
quite possible that the stations saw the prime time rule as a chance to
maximize audience and profit.
Secondly, since the decision in Office of Communications of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC,52 many minority groups have chal-
lenged the license renewals of local broadcast television stations, alleg-
ing that the stations are in violation of the fairness doctrine or are fail-
ing to present balanced programming.53 Many local stations have
forestalled such challenges by agreeing to the formation of minority
advisory committees, which were accorded a voice in the development
of programming directed to the needs and cultural interests of minor-
ity viewers. 4
Broadcast stations, however, have often failed to meet the spirit of
the agreement and have resisted giving minority advisory committees
the resources necessary to carry out their responsibilities. 0 This has
resulted in severe problems for committee programming plans leaving
only the dimmest prospects for the future. 6
51. TV GumE, Jan. 27, 1973, at 6-7. But see In re "prime time access rule," 29 P & F
RADIo RaG. 2d 643, 660-69 (1974), for a compilation of the various contentions concerning
the positive and negative effects of the 1970 rule. See also BROADCASTING, Feb. 7, 1972,
at 52-54.
52. 425 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (representatives of the listening public have
standing to contest the renewal of a broadcast station's license). For a general discussion
of the use of the renewal licensing process as a method of monitoring program per-
formance and achieving media reform, see Note, Media Reform Through Comparative
License-Renewal Procedures-The Citizen's Case, 57 IowA L. REV. 912 (1972).
53. Approximately 150 petitions to deny have been filed in two years. Interview with
Albert Kramer, Director of the Citizen's Communication Center, in Washington, D.C.,
Mar. 8, 1973 (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal). So far there has been only one
successful challenge. See Pember, supra note 1, at 92-105.
54. In 1970 one such agreement was negotiated between Capital Cities Corporation
which owns stations in Philadelphia, Pa., Fresno, Cal., and New Haven, Conn., and
the Black and Spanish-speaking communities served by these stations. The agreement's
primary feature was a commitment by Capital Cities to contribute one million dollars
over a three year period to the "development of programming which reflects the views,
aspirations, problems and culture of Black and Spanish-surnamed minority groups .....
Capital Cities Minority Programming Agreement, 1970, at 5. To facilitate the most ex-
pedient use of the money, minority advisory committees composed of volunteer com-
munity representatives were formed at each of the stations. The agreement included
provisions for telecasting a specified percentage of the programming during prime time.
Id. at 6. None of the allocated funds, however, could be spent, nor any program aired,
without the broadcast company's express permission. The station management also had
to agree to the minority advisory committee's composition. Id. at 7.
55. The necessity to negotiate and justify even trivial expenditures drains the com-
mittee's time and energy, often distracting it from its primary purpose. See, e.g., letters
from Phillip Morrow, Moderator of the New Haven Minority Advisory Comm., to Peter
Orne, Gen'l Manager of WTNH-Channel 8, New Haven, Conn., Oct. 11, 1972 9- Feb. 9,
1973 (on file with the Yale Law Journal). Meanwhile, the frustration of the constant
delays has resulted in the resignations of a committee member and the executive producer.
56. Interview with Phillip Morrow, Comm. member, in New Haven, Conn, Apr. 10,
1973 (notes on file with the Yale Law Journal).
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III. Community Ownership as a Guarantee of Community
Self-Expression
The FCC regulatory approach for CATV thus contains certain
weaknesses which may threaten its ability to ensure community self-
expression. Another approach 57 to community self-expression which
may alleviate many of these weaknesses is community5s ownership of
CATV systems. Community ownership means, at the very least, that
persons from the particular community served by a CATV franchise
control that franchise on behalf of the community. They should have
direct influence over such factors as how and for what purposes chan-
nels are allocated, how much funding community self-expression will
receive, and what kind of access to the system will be available.
A. Community Ownership and the Problems in the FCC's
Public Access Approach
Community ownership counters the weaknesses in the FCC's regu-
latory approach to community self-expression because it establishes
automatic diversity of control of CATV systems. Diversity of control
in turn provides a more solid potential for diversity of program ma-
terial because communities differ in cultural tastes, foci of immediate
concern, and social perspectives. Such control by the local community
will ameliorate problems of centralized FCC enforcement by making
the CATV franchise directly responsible to the local community. 59
57. A third approach which has received a great deal of public comment is to give
"common carrier" status to all CATV channels. A number of observers have suggested
that prohibiting the CATV proprietor from producing programming would minimize the
effects of concentration of control and thereby create an opportunity for diversification
of programming. See F. POWLEDGE, AN ACLU GUIDE TO CABLE TELEVISION 31-33 (1972)
(ACLU pamphlet); Barnett, supra note 5, at 237-46; Note, Common Carrier CATV: Prob-
lems and Proposals, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533 (1971). This alternative, however, has
several shortcomings. First, it is important to note that the present FCC public access
channels are now operated on a common carrier basis. See note 17 supra. Therefore, a
common carrier CATV system would conceivably confront the same problems of funding
and expertise among users that loom large for the public access channels. Second, if
all the CATV channels were to be used as freely as the telephone, it is probable that
the general public could not supply enough adequate programming to fill all or even
a substantial portion of the available cable-time. This task would probably be assumed
to a large extent by professionals who would be best equipped to profit from such a
situation. Consequently, most of the programming might well be produced by only a
few, resulting in the same dearth of program diversity that common carrier proponents
seek to avoid. Finally, the complex procedural and administrative problems involved in
giving common carrier status to CATV systems may be insurmountable at this time.
See FCC Clarification 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 14291-92 (1974); Barnett, supra note 5, at 246-49;
Note, supra, at 543-46.
58. The term "community" refers to all residents of an ascertainable geographic
area, such as a town's boundaries, a metropolitan area, or a rural district, and includes
all the diverse ethnic and cultural groups represented among the community's residents.
59. The FCC has approximately 3,000 CATV systems under its authority. TELEVISION Di-
GEst, CATV ADDENDA TO TELEVISION FACraOOK No. 42, at 1 (Dec. 18, 1972) (weekly CATV
addenda). There are substantial difficulties in exercising effective enforcement of the
public access provisions on such a broad scale.
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Local ownership will also provide a natural barrier to further nation-
wide concentration of ownership of CATV franchises. Additionally,
maintaining cable television's independence from large corporations
might improve the public's attitude towards the medium, thereby
encouraging greater citizen participation in public access opportuni-
ties.6 0
Community control through community ownership is also more
likely to provide the funds and media expertise to insure high quality
community programming. Cable television represents a profitable
business venture largely because of its ability to retelecast the signals
of distant broadcast TV stations.0 ' The profitability of CATV does
not depend on whether it is nationally or community owned. 2
Under a community-owned system the profits from the franchise
can be devoted to the production of community programming and to
the training of community members in the technical skills necessary
to produce such programming.
Whether community ownership in fact produces high quality, locally
oriented programming and skilled personnel depends largely on
whether the community actually exercises control over the operation
of its franchise. If the community does not exercise such actual con-
trol, only "local"-and not "community"-ownership can be said to
60. See, e.g., H. BRUCKER, COMMUNICkTION IS POWER 173-77 (1973); J. KAPPER, TiE
EFFECTS OF MASS MEDIA 1-20 (1950); R. SHAYON, THE CROWD CATCHERS: INTRODUCING
TELEVISION 116-49 (1973).
61. Initially, cable television was so profitable that it made a considerable number
of millionaires. Since then, it has become less a "bonanza" and more a respectable in-
vestment venture. In any event, subscribers to the service usually pay anywhere from
five to ten dollars per month. Thus, long after the operator has paid off his initial
capital expenditure he still receives the monthly charge. See PRICE & WICKLEIN, supra
note 4, at 8-9; Barnett, supra note 5, at 210-11; Botein, supra note 2, at 453. A proposed
municipally owned system has projected profits of three million dollars per year after
ten years. BROADCASTING, Oct. 16, 1972, at 56. But see M. SEMDEN, supra note 40, at 29-48.
For a general review of the economics of operating a' CATV system, see Druckman,
Economics of CATV, Sept. 1, 1970, at 4 (report prepared for the Sloan Comm'n).
The self-sufficiency of a cable system could be affected by the size of the community
served by the franchise. Where the population density and size was either too small
or too large, there are reasons to believe that the time required for a CATV system
to reach financial self-sufficiency could be retarded. Problems would arise in communi-
ties which do not possess the population density necessary to support a cable system
and, therefore, do not possess enough potential subscribers to support a system. These
communities are likely to receive cable only where state regulatory bodies compelled
a franchisee to wire rural localities as a condition to receiving the franchise in more
profitable, densely populated areas. See, e.g., In re State Highway Comm'n, No. 10252
(Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Mar. 12, 1964). Perhaps advancing cable technology will
eventually make CATV's introduction into such areas economically possible; until then
community ownership will probably be unlikely.
62. Other factors such as degree of market penetration and the impact of FCC
rules will influence cable's profitability. For an exploration of these considerations and
their effect on CATV financial rates of return, see Adler & Karl, The Financial Impact
of Proposed Federal and State Regulations on a Typical CATV System, Mar. 16, 1971
(paper prepared for the Sloan Comm'n).
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exist. A locally owned franchise which is not controlled by the com-
munity in some form 63 could well be operated in the style of a nation-
ally owned franchise, with its profits and position of influence serving
extra-community ends. On the other hand, a truly community-owned
system responsive to the community can redirect the profit and influ-
ence from private to community ends.
Community ownership of CATV does not necessarily require pro-
gramming designed for the community. Community ownership only
creates a capacity for community self-expression not provided by na-
tionally based, private ownership. Although few empirical studies have
analyzed community preferences, the great increase in demand on
presently existing public access facilities in those systems monitored
indicated that community programming will be desired. 4 In any
event, a decision not to have community programming is itself a form
of community self-expression.
B. Alternative Forms of Community Ownership
There are four basic business forms that a community might employ
for ownership. Each of these would provide at least a partial answer
to the vital question of how control of a community-owned system
would be established and allocated. Three of these alternatives would
be generated and operated by private but community-oriented sources,
while the fourth would be quasi-public in form.
The first business form follows the profit-oriented corporate model,
with shares of stock being sold to community members. In light of its
promise of substantial profits, it would be especially attractive to
minority groups in which there is a strong interest in keeping venture
capital within the group and in fostering indigenous business develop-
ment.0 6 Although not well suited to provide for broad-based com-
munity input, this form of ownership would be particularly good
where there is a need for balancing the media representation of various
groups within the community. The CATV franchise could be owned
and operated by members of a minority group which is otherwise
63. Such control might be exercised through elections, ownership of stock, or a
system of membership rights. See pp. 1722-26 infra.
64. In New York, where two CATV systems provide public access channels, the num-
ber of hours of public access programming has increased from approximately nine to
135 hours a week. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 35. However, sub-
scription rates have lagged about 36 percent behind what had been anticipated. Id. at 46.
65. This is what has been done in Watts, California. CABLELINES, Mar. 1974, at 9.
The Urban Institute has suggested that the Model Cities programs and Community De-
velopment Corporations be the nuclei for a system of this type. CABLE TELEVISION IN
THE CIms, supra note 2, at 31.
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generally excluded from representation in the local communications
media. 66
The profit-oriented corporate model, however, presents a few im-
portant difficulties with respect to continued community influence.
Unless a majority of the voting stock is sold to and remains in the
hands of members of the community, there is less assurance that the
community's desires will be followed in corporate decisions affecting
community self-expression. Even if community members control a
majority of the stock, the stockholders may not actually control the
decisions of the board of directors. Also, there is some danger that the
control of the stock might remain in the hands of those community
members who maintain a greater interest in profit maximization than
in community concerns. Nevertheless, the broader the dispersion of
stock ownership within the entire community, the more responsive
to all segments of the community shareholder decisions are likely to be.
A second possible private business form is the nonprofit corporation.
If properly established, its chief potential advantage would be its
ability to attract funding because of the possibility of tax deductions. 7
This asset, however, might be its greatest weakness because, unless the
community members were affluent enough to be benefited by the tax
incentives of this business form, the motivation for them to contribute
would be significantly reduced, jeopardizing community control. For
this reason, the nonprofit form would be attractive only for those
communities with a fairly stable economic base.68
The directors in the nonprofit business form would be less likely
to forget the goal of community self-expression than would their
counterparts in the profit-oriented corporate model. A group or com-
munity employing a nonprofit rather than profit form, however,
66. Minority group control of a CATV franchise can be justified, even if such
groups would not be responsive to the entire community, because of the exclusion of
minority groups from the broadcast media and the potentially disruptive influence that
voicelessness has on minority groups. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CIVIL Dis-
ORDERS, REPORT 210 (1968). Cultural and racial minorities and low-income groups all
suffer from underexposure on broadcast television. Other groups, to the extent that
they are part of white, middle class, mainstream America, are relatively better off. See,
e.g., Comments of Youth Organizations United, Inc. at 3-8, In re Amendment of Part
74, Nos. 18397-A, 18891 & 18892 (FCC 1970). In fact, income and the need for greater
representation on broadcast television may be inversely proportional. See generally
Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 45-70.
There are problems with this compensatory approach, however. Administratively, it
may be exceedingly difficult to decide who is included within a particular group or
who the group's true representatives are. See B. BITrRER, THE CASE FOR BLAcK REPARA-
TIONS 71-86, 91-104 (1973).
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501.
68. See generally Rusan, What You See is What To Get: Cable Television and
Community Control, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACrION 278-80 (1972).
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would find it more difficult to capture investment capital from con-
ventional business sources.
A third private business form is the cooperative. The chief attrac-
tion of this alternative is that it is a democratically composed and
managed association which offers significant equality of ownership
and control."" Every subscriber to the cable system would assume
member status and acquire a direct voice in shaping the form and
extent of community self-expression in the CATV system. The coop-
erative would probably be practical only in smaller communities of
10,000 people or less,7 0 due to the difficulty of administering its
democratic form of management on a larger scale.
71
The last basic business form entails either direct or indirect owner-
ship of the CATV franchise by a municipality or township.72 A prin-
cipal advantage of this municipal form is that, for many localities, the
municipality may be the only entity in the community with the
financial and organizational capacity necessary to undertake CATV
ownership. Specifically, lenders will be more inclined to stake a city
than a private group with the venture capital necessary to start a
CATV system. Fuither, since municipal ownership could be construed
69. See generally I. PACKEL, Tim ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES (1970).
70. CABLE TELEVISION IN THE CITIES, supra note 2, at 33.
71. Variations on these basic models can be achieved through the use of turn-key
arrangements, whereby an outside CATV manufacturing firm constructs the system
and then sells or leases it back to the community. Also, profit and nonprofit corpora-
tions can be used in tandem in order to acquire some of the advantages of both
variations. Equally possible is a joint venture concept, featuring a purely business cor-
poration tied to a community corporation. The community-based corporation would
maintain a controlling equity interest in the arrangement. For a description of even
more esoteric arrangements, see PRICE & 'WICKLEIN, supra note 4, at 40-42; S. Rivkin,
Shaping Ownership and Control in the Cable Television Industry, Feb. 11, 1971, app. c
(prepared for Sloan Comm'n).
72. In some states, there would probably have to be legislative action specifically
permitting the municipal form of ownership. See, e.g., Byers v. Board of Supervisors of
San Bernardino County, 262 Cal. App. 2d 148, 68 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1968) (a city board
of supervisors cannot imply this power and must wait for express state legislative au-
thorization before it could own and operate a television translator service).
The nature of such legislation will depend on whether or not CATV is treated as
a public utility by the state. Five states regulate CATV as a public utility. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 16-330 to -33 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711 (Supp. 1970);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 8 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 501-08
(Supp. 1973); Illinois Commerce Comm'n, Investigation of Cable Television and Other
Forms of Broadband Cable Communications in the State of Illinois, reprinted in 22
P & F RADIO REG. 2d 2192 (1971). If CATV is viewed as a public utility, municipal
ownership is permitted if a state statute grants municipalities, counties, or other forms
of local government the authority to purchase and operate public utilities. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-117-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Otherwise, it would probably
be necessary to institute a specific amendment to the public utilities statute. See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §, 2901-22 (1970) (specifically authorizes municipal ownership of
only power and water utilities).
If CATV is not viewed as a public utility, then a state must probably amend its
existing CATV statutes to permit municipal ownership. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 53066 (West 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 166A, § 1 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 811 (McKinney 1972).
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as involving state action, it would permit any unrepresented minority
group to protect its constitutional interests in court.
73
However, it would be unwise to embrace too readily a system of
communications owned by local governments, since generally local
government is not a strong defender of First Amendment rights of
free expression. Furthermore, municipalities may tend to use the pro-
ceeds from CATV to fund other municipal services. Abuses might
arise where a city government chose to bleed financially the cable
operation to the detriment of the subscribers and community self-
expression.
74
In light of these problems, perhaps the best organization for mu-
nicipal ownership would be one that gave the city's cable managing
agent the greatest autonomy in decisions on community expression.
To facilitate this, the municipality could form a separate corporate
body which, while accountable to the city, in a restricted sense, would
have the responsibility for day-to-day operation of the cable system. 7r
Another problem associated with municipal ownership is the estab-
lishing and allocating of control. Once an institution has been estab-
lished for operating a city-owned CATV system, all segments of the
community must be assured a voice in decisionmaking about those
matters related to community self-expression. The theory of munic-
ipal ownership is that the election of municipal officials will ensure
that the franchise is responsive to the concerns of the community.
Some additional procedure, however, should be provided, especially
in highly heterogeneous communities (where the community compris-
ing the entire municipality includes several subcommunities), to guar-
antee that smaller segments of the community with fewer votes can
participate in the municipal CATV system.
A possible solution might be to designate cable time or a com-
munity programming channel for each of the different segments
within a given community system.76 On this basis each subcommunity
73. See Note, The First Amendment and the 'Abridgeable' Right of Self-Expression,
72 COLUm. L. REv. 1249, 1252, 1254-59 (1972).
74. At a conference sponsored by the National League of Cities and the United States
Conference of Mayors, Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York likened cable to "the dis-
covery of urban oil wells under our city streets," and asserted further that "we have
the right to develop public income from that asset to be used for the public good."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 73, col. 3.
75. The accountability to the city could result from a combination of regularly
scheduled hearings and intermittent reports. This accountability, however, would only
extend to a determination of the corporation's financial condition and of its conformity
to the declaration of intent concerning community self-expression established in the
franchise agreement.
76. For a discussion of the problems in discerning the different groups which make
up a given community and establishing who their members and representatives are, see
B. BtTrKrR, supra note 66, at 91-104.
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would be allowed to decide what type of community self-expression it
wanted. Alternatively, channels or cable-time for community interest
programming could be allocated on the basis of wards or districts, into
which most municipalities are divided, allowing each division to estab-
lish its own procedure for allocation among its inhabitants. As a
third possibility, channels or cable-time might be allocated to com-
munity service programs that cater to particular communities.77
Occasionally, however, these prophylactic measures dealing with
potential disputes would be either impracticable or insufficient. This
eventuality should be met by the creation of a grievance procedure,
perhaps patterned after those found in many unions, 8 which would
hear and resolve the complaints of groups and individuals who feel
that they have been unjustly overlooked by the municipal CATV
system. Initially, a dispute over community-oriented programming
would pass through a preliminary level where the parties would be
encouraged to resolve their differences on their own. The final stage
might be compulsory arbitration, employing an arbitrator from out-
side the system area, mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Finally, to provide an outlet for minority expression even in situa-
tions where the measures outlined above fail to resolve a dispute, the
current FCC public access provisions"9 should be retained. Despite
their inadequacies, the present rules would serve as a backstop for
community ownership, no matter what business form is employed, and
would continue to provide at least some public access in those com-
munities where community ownership has not been instituted.
IV. Needed Regulatory Changes
To foster community ownership on the widest scale possible, two
basic changes should be made in the present regulatory scheme. The
first and most important one addresses the manner of determining
franchise allocation. FCC regulations should establish a priority scale
which favors community ownership. This would be a device to be used
by each local franchising agency in the allocation of CATV franchises,
guiding the agency's discretion in choosing among applicants who
have already met the minimum financial, technical and character
77. Such service programs might include, for example, Model Cities programs or
Community Development Corporations.
78. For a survey of the workings of labor grievance procedure, see N. CHAMBERLAIN,
SOURCEnOOK ON LABOR 191-219 (1964).
79. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4) (1973).
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qualifications in the present rules.80 Adoption of the scale thus would
not mean the awarding of franchises to unqualified operators; each
applicant would first have to be judged financially sound and pos-
sessed of the necessary technical and business knowledge to operate
a CATV franchise successfully. Beyond that point, simply stated, each
franchise applicant would be ranked according to a point scale. Points
would be awarded in each of several specified categories. What follows
is a sketch of one possible set of categories.
The first category of the priority scale would assess localism of
ownership. As was pointed out earlier, if the ownership is indigenous,
the potential for influence of local concerns in the system's operation
is greatly increased.8' An applicant's localism would be measured by
the percentage of ownership in the hands of residents of the franchise
area. Even where the franchise applicant is a corporation whose share-
holders live both within and without the local franchise area, the
locality-of-ownership criterion is relatively objective and readily ascer-
tainable, allowing little room for the discretion of the local franchis-
ing authority.
A second, related category would favor the applicant who most
represents the community to be served by the CATV system. Repre-
sentativeness is measured by the extent to which those controlling a
CATV system reflect the racial, ethnic and cultural makeup within
the franchise area. Representativeness, though similar to localism,
goes further in ensuring that all segments of the franchise area are af-
forded the opportunity to influence the operation of the CATV
system.
8 2
A third category would favor applicants who represent the least
concentration of CATV ownership. Concentration of ownership in
the communications industry endangers free expression by discourag-
80. Id. § 76.31 (1973). This scheme would not disrupt the present federal-state/local
relationship regarding the regulation of cable television.
81. See pp. 1716-17 supra. Representativeness of applicants could be improved in-
directly by more realistic publication and notice requirements with respect to a fran-
chise available for award. See note 32 supra. One such approach for notice requirements
is the recently issued rules and regulations of the Treasury Department for revenue
sharing. 31 C.F.R. § 51 (1973). Not only are revenue sharing reports to be published
in a newspaper of "general circulation" by the local government issuing them, but
also there must be an effort to "advise the news media, including minority and bilingual
news media, within its geographic area." Id. § 51.13(a) & (b).
82. Although the applicant which represents the broadest cross-section of the popula-
tion of the franchise area should ordinarily score highest on the representativeness cri-
terion, the scale might also consider the degree to which certain groups are denied
effective representation by the area's existing communications media. For instance, an
applicant representing a minority group overlooked by the existing local media would
not represent a cross-section of the franchise area, but awarding a franchise to such
an applicant might effectively balance the representativeness of the area's total com-
munications media. See note 75 supra.
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ing diversified, locally-oriented programming.83 Under this criterion
an applicant would be required to divulge how many broadcast and
CATV systems he already owned, directly or indirectly. To choose
between applicants of equally large size, consideration might be given
to the proportion of an applicant's existing communications property
within reach of the franchise area. Because highly concentrated con-
trol of the communications facilities within a given area or region
represents a more immediate danger than ownership dispersed
throughout the country, the applicant with the fewest holdings near
the franchise area would be favored.
The fourth and last category would measure an applicant's public
access capacity. Several factors would be taken into consideration. One
of them would be the type and quality of equipment an applicant
plans to make available for public access and viewer feedback. For
example, the type of two-way system used can have important conse-
quences for community self-expression. 4 In general, the more sophis-
ticated the technology, the more effective and diverse community
self-expression is likely to be.85 Additional factors in this public access
capacity category include the number of channels an applicant intends
to provide8 for public access and leasing purposes, and the accessibility
of the applicant's public access studios to the residents of the fran-
chise area.
The chief purpose of the priority scale is to reduce the discretion
of the local regulatory authorities over the allocation of CATV fran-
chises and thus reduce the likelihood of the "smoke-filled room" type
of decision in which favoritism and other factors are given more con-
sideration than is the public's interest in community self-expression.87
Furthermore, a priority scale which requires the authority to make
explicit its judgments about various applicants makes it easier to police
against abuses of the authority's discretion.
Economically, the priority scale should encourage what might be
called public access competitive bidding: franchise applicants should
seek to rank as high as possible on the priority scale, increasing their
chances of receiving the CATV franchise, without having prohibitive
expenditures which would compromise the financial success of the
undertaking. Simultaneously, minimal financial, technical and char-
83. See pp. 1716-17 supra.
84. See note 81 supra. This feature is already required under the present public
access rules but only in the most primitive form. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(3) (1973).
85. See pp. 1712-13 supra.
86. See p. 1711 supra.
87. See note 35 supra.
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acter requirements, 88 uniformly imposed on all applicants for a sys-
tem, would insure that the concern for community self-expression not
lead to fiscal irresponsibility.
A significant obstacle to achievement of the goal of fostering com-
munity ownership of CATV systems is that so many CATV franchises
have already been allocated by local authorities to large CATV op-
erators, even in cases where the franchisee does not plan to begin
laying cable for years to come. 89 The second regulatory change thus
needed to open ownership opportunities to community groups in-
volves FCC restrictions on cross-ownership 90 and common ownership,
limiting the concentration of control of CATV systems. Unlike the
concentration criterion of the priority scale9 ' which would only apply
to the allocation of new franchises, these restrictions on concentration
of control would gradually apply to previously granted franchises.
Those licensees who possess more than a certain number of holdings
overall or within a given geographical area would face nonrenewal of
the CATV franchise. In order to ensure that no community presently
served by a cable system would be totally deprived of the service, how-
ever, nonrenewal would only occur where another qualified applicant
challenged the renewal of the license. The challenger would have to
stand ready to reimburse the divested licensee for losses incurred in
abandoning his fixtures, the challenger thereby becoming the owner
of the system.92 Prospective applicants, interested in seeing a CATV
system made available for their acquisition, would act as private
attorneys general, ferreting out unduly large concentrations of CATV
ownership.
Properly enforced, the two proposed regulations would reverse the
88. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(1) (1973).
89. BROADCASTING, June 10, 1974, at 24. In Connecticut, although 17 franchises were
awarded in 1967, only five systems were beyond preliminary construction by May 1974;
only three were actually operating; four had accomplished no construction at all. Public
Information Program for Connecticut Libraries, Connecticut CATV Status Report, Apr.
22, 1974 (on file with the Yale Law Journal and the Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n). ste
Connecticut Television, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 159 Conn. 317, 321-24, 269 A.2d
276, 279-80 (1970).
90. These should apply to most segments of the communications media including
television and radio stations, CATV systems, and communications equipment manufac-
turing concerns. The current regulations include certain minimal prohibitions on cross-
ownership. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1973). See note 47 supra.
91. See p. 1727 supra.
92. This provision should overcome any possible claims of a taking of property
without compensation. At any rate it is clear that the licensee has no property interest
in the renewal of his license. See Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266,
282-85 (1933) (established that the FCC is not bound to maintain a license allocation if
fair and equitable distribution compelled a change). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
1728
Vol. 83: 1708, 1974
Toward Community Ownership of Cable Television
trend towards ownership concentration and would free existing fran-
chises for acquisition by community groups and other local entities. 98
Conclusion
Cable television has the technological potential to permit commu-
nity self-expression. However, the increasing trend towards concentra-
tion of CATV ownership, the FCC's ambiguous and inadequate
CATV public access rules, and the insensitivity of local franchising
authorities and CATV operators to the value of community input
threaten to undermine the potential of community participation in
cable television.
The most effective way to assure that community self-expression
becomes a reality is through community ownership of CATV systems.
This can be achieved by means of a number of different community
ownership forms whose relative suitability depends on the demogra-
phy and geography of a particular community. But whether this possi-
bility becomes a reality depends largely on FCC action to open up
the cable field. FCC regulations should be amended to reduce the
passive holdings of large communications companies and to channel
the discretion of local franchising authorities, setting enforceable
priorities which will favor community ownership.
93. The advent of widespread community ownership of CATV outlets should have
the further virtue of reducing the FcC's profile in the area of programming. This is
desirable in view of the Commission's history of poor policy planning, its industry
orientation, and its inconsistent application of its regulations. See H. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS
53-58 (1962); Jaffe, The Scandal in TV Licensing, HARPER'S, Sept. 1957, at 77; Johnson
& Dystel, supra note 45, at 1589.
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